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Abstract
We propose trust to enhance security in adaptive and non-intrusive user authentication in controlled and
pervasive environments. In addition to who a user is (e.g., via biometrics) and what a user knows (e.g.,
a password, a PIN), recent authentication solutions evaluate what a user has. The user’s identity is then
derived from what detectable accredited items (e.g., badges, RFIDs) and personal devices (e.g., smart-
phones, PDAs) the user shows when authenticating. The level of security of the access is set consequently.
Position information is also considered in authentication; only those users carrying authorised items in
proximity of certain places can beneﬁt from available resources at those places. Unfortunately, items such
as badges, mobile phones, smart phones, RFID-ed cards can be stolen, forgotten, or lost with a consequent
risk of identity theft and intrusion. In controlled environment like buildings, where sensors can detect a wide
range of diﬀerent types of items, the security of authentication can be improved by evaluating the amount
of trust that can be reposed on the user standing in the area from where he tries to access a resource. This
piece of information can be calculated from the positions of all the items linkable to the requester as sensed
along time by the diﬀerent sensors available. Sensors are seen as recommenders that give opinions on a
user being in a requested position depending on what they have perceived in the environment. We apply
Subjective Logics to model recommendations that originate from diﬀerent types of location detectors and
to combine them into a trust value. Our solution has been tested to improve authentication in an intelligent
coﬀee corner of our research institute. A user at the coﬀee corner can see, displayed on a wall screen, the
position of his colleagues depending on the level of authentication he obtains. The user authentication level
depends on the number and on the quality of tokens he provides when authenticating. We comment how
the use of a location-based trust (on the requester standing at the coﬀee corner) improves the adaptability,
the non-intrusiveness, and the security of the authentication process. We validate our proposal with a
simulation that shows how location-based trust changes when a user device moves away from the coﬀee
corner.
Keywords: Trust-enhanced Security, Adaptive Authentication, Sensor Fusing, Subjective Logic.
1 Introduction
In the domain of pervasive computing, users make use of their personal devices,
for example smart phones, laptops, PDAs etc, to beneﬁt from resources or services
oﬀered by the environment. The access is usually protected by access control mech-
anisms that demand users to show authorised credentials before granting a request
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of use. User credentials have the ultimate goal to authenticate the user, that is to
convince the access control engine that the requester has the identity, the role, or
the privileges [20, 19] that allows him to use (possibly with some limitation) the
resource/service according to an authorisation policy.
Typical authentication solutions consider who a user is (e.g., biometric measure-
ments), what a user knows (e.g., a password, a PIN) and, recently, also what the
user has (e.g., badges, RFIDs, smart-phones, PDAs). In this latter case, the user’s
identity is derived from the detectable accredited items and personal devices the
user carries when authenticating.
Particular attention is needed when security is asked to be adaptive and when
privacy is asked to be preserved. Adaptivity requires ﬂexible procedures of control
being able to react to situational changes in a non-intrusive way. For example, a user
trying (with his personal device) to access to a web-service oﬀered by the railway
company should be allowed to use the service when he is actually travelling on a
train, but he must be deprived of the same rights as soon as he leaves the train [9].
Privacy targets contradict those of a secure authentication that requires revealing
private information like a PIN or a credit card number. In fact, while service
providers demand for users’ personal data to protect their services from misuse,
users want to avoid releasing personal information when not strictly necessary.
Indirect information about the user, such as contextual data, can be used to reach
adaptability while reducing the frequency of the need of conﬁdential information. By
processing positional data, the resources available in a certain place can be accessed
by users carrying accredited items in proximity of that place. Unfortunately, the
analysis of multiple contextual data presents typical diﬃculties that arise from the
management of multiple sources of context information [24]. Some source provides
only partial pieces of information about the user (e.g., Bluetooth devices indicate
where the device, not the user, is located); others are only partially unreliable
(e.g., sensors have a certain probability of false positiveness). Sources can also be
contradictory (e.g., the RFID sensor shows that the user is at the ﬁrst ﬂoor, but
the GPS indicates he is out of the building): because badges, mobile phones, smart
phones, and RFID-ed cards can be stolen, forgotten, or lost, contradictions in the
location of those devices may reveal an identity theft and an attempt of intrusion.
To enhance security in adaptive and non-intrusive authentication we propose to
associate the authentication process with a trust evaluation process. Intuitively, by
the analysis of the diﬀerent kinds of location information related to a requester,
we evaluate the trust that can be reposed on a statement about position of the
requester. To evaluate the trustworthiness on a user position, we consider the
diﬀerent sources of location information as recommenders giving opinion on the
statement “the user, whose identity emerges from the identity tokens provided, is
standing in proximity of the place where the request is submitted”. Recommenda-
tions are merged into a trust value. The (context-independent) authentication is
therefore re-evaluated at the light of the trust emerging from the context. In case
of low trustworthiness, the user can be asked to provide additional (context-related
or context-independent) credentials. We design a theoretical framework based on
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Subjective Logic [10,11] and we instantiate it in an intelligent coﬀee corner scenario
we have set up in our research institute. Presently, a user approaching the coﬀee
corner can see, on a wall-screen, the position of his colleagues. Which colleagues
will appear on the screen depends upon the level of authentication the user obtains
by the number and the quality of identity tokens provided when authenticating.
We propose to enhance the coﬀee corner’s authentication with the use of location-
based trust. Location-based trust on “the user standing at the coﬀee corner” is
evaluated from the location of the diﬀerent items belonging to the user and sensed
in the environment. The access control engine can evaluate the trust information
together with the level of (context-independent) authentication to decide upon the
access. In a simulation, we show how the location-based trust changes when a
detectable user device is brought near or moved away the coﬀee table. We cope with
sensors that cover diﬀerent area and that collect location information at diﬀerent
time frequencies.
Our proposal requires the support of an infrastructure where contextual infor-
mation and digital identities (anonymous or not) are appropriately managed. We
therefore make use of the infrastructure that has been developed in the Dutch Free-
band project called AWARENESS [8], to which our study is strictly connected.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the idea of strength-
ening authentication by the use of contextual information and context-aware trust.
Section 3 reminds the basics of Subjective Logic, whilst section 4 explains how to
calculate trust given a set of location sources. Section 5 describes how to instantiate
our framework into a realistic model of sensors. Section 6 comments the results of
the simulation we did to validate our location-based trust algorithm. The related
work is presented in Section 7 and Section 8 draws the conclusion and points out
the future work.
2 Location-based Trust in Authentication
This section gives insight into our idea of using contextual data and location-based
trust in the authentication process.
Since the ﬁrst works about a trust approach to security, (e.g., [5,19,4]) we know
that behind any request of access to a resource there is the provision of a set of
credentials. The entity that guards the access to the resource validates whether the
credentials conform with the local security policy before granting the request. In
the pervasive domain that we are addressing, credentials are generally constituted
by who the user is and what the user knows, namely biometric measurements and
secrets. Because people carry personal devices, recent solutions accept also “what
the user has” as a paradigm for identiﬁcation.
At least at conceptual level, when a requester submits his request and credentials
he also submits an authentication statement, p, which expresses a claim, for example,
saying that the requester possesses certain qualities of which the set of credentials,
C, constitutes or contributes to a proof of validity. Here we imagine the requester
forwarding the pair (C, p) to the access control agent acting as an oracle: by the
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analysis of C the agent checks or builds a proof (cf. [1, 2]) for the validity of p and
judges whether to allow access or not. Keeping this description as simple as possible,
(i.e., without considering obligations and post-conditions [7]), the analysis of (C, p)
returns a conﬁdence value, L. If binary, L expresses either an authorisation or a
denial; if multivalued, it relates to the level of conﬁdence in the requester identity
or role and then to the level of authentication granted. Without loss of generality,
we assume that L ranges in the real interval [0, 1]. Here, L = 0 is the lowest value,
meaning access denied, and L = 1 is the highest, meaning full access.
When C = {c1, . . . , cn} are multiple identity credentials (i.e., password, RFID,
Bluetooth, etc) the conﬁdence level L can be calculated as 1−(1−L1)(1−L2) . . . (1−
Ln) [17]. Here, each Li expresses the measure of conﬁdence in the user’s identity
that emerges from the analysis of ci. Informally, sources with low conﬁdence values
decrease L, while sources with a high conﬁdence values increase L. The relation
above assumes that the credential items are independent, which makes sense if all of
them are validated within a given common context. Moreover, L depends only on
those credentials that are actually shown by the requester. Generally, however, the
context in which each authentication method validates the corresponding credential
is not the same for all methods. For example, the RFID attests the location of a
user within a circle of 5 meters, while the Bluetooth does it within a circle of 10
meters; or the cells of RFID and of Bluetooth overlap partially with each other
or with the area of interest at which the authentication process takes place. Such
contextual diﬀerences at which various credentials are derived and validated should
be taken into account in an advanced authentication framework. In this contribution
we propose to model these contextual discrepancies as a measure of trust that
applies to the process of merging the credential items. We present an authentication
framework with such a trust management component.
Contextual information can be modelled in trust-based security according to
what proposed in [15]. In that research, Krukow aﬃrms that a model of security
that includes trust management requires, besides the set C of signed credentials,
an additional set I of not necessarily accredited information such as, for instance,
recommendations. The set I is used to improve the authentication process. In our
domain, we assume that I is related with “location” information of the items in C.
For example, a mobile phone is both an identity credential (we can check if a mobile
phone is Bob’s, for example) and a source of location information (it links to the
network cell where the mobile phone is detected). Then, I is used to build a set of
recommendations about a security-related statement that concerns the position of
the user. Recommendations are then merged into a measure of the trustworthiness
of that statement. The statement p considered in this paper sounds informally
as “the user, whose identity (or role) emerges from C, is standing at the location
where the request has been forwarded”. Our proposal to enhance the adaptability
of security and privacy in authentication is built on the evaluation of a context-
driven trust measure, trust(p), in addition to the evaluation of the authentication
conﬁdence level L. The validity of p, i.e., the evaluation of L, is derived from
intrinsic properties of C whilst the measurement of trust(p) derives from the analysis
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of contextual properties in I. Our proposal is conceived for controlled environments,
like buildings, shop centres, cities, or generally well deﬁned areas where I can be
easily collected.
Example 2.1 Bob requests for a certain service from his registered WiFi-enabled
laptop. He stands at a certain location l, so p informally expresses the statement
that is Bob standing at location l. Bob also carries a Bluetooth-enabled smart
phone, accredited to him, whose presence (thanks to a Bluetooth detector) is con-
sidered in the authentication process. An identiﬁcation with a badge would have
been preferred in this case, so the control access agent authenticate Bob at a con-
ﬁdence level 0.88. To the laptop corresponds an authentication level of 0.7, while
the presence of a Bob’s Bluetooth device determines a 0.6 level of conﬁdence. The
overall L is then 1− 0.3× 0.4 = 0.88. Bob is assumed in proximity of l, but contex-
tual data indicates that Bob’s badge has been sensed at the same time in a diﬀerent
location far from l: thus, trust(p) is low. If the authentication process is adaptive,
the access control engine can either it can take into account extra contextual infor-
mation (e.g., other location sources) to enlighten about Bob standing at l, or ask
for additional credentials (e.g., Bob’s password).
We supports the use of context-aware trust as a back-end stage of a primary
validation process, as studied in [22]. Therefore, once trust(p) is evaluated, the
overall and context-aware degree of access is L trust(p), where  is an appropriate
operator. For example, if we also assume that trust values range in the real interval
[0, 1] (where 0 means distrust and 1 complete trust)  can be the real multiplication.
In case of complete trust the authentication result is left untouched, otherwise it is
de-ampliﬁed at the light of trust(p).
In the following sections, we tailor our study to deal with user’s location. We
approximate p with u ∈ l (we write p(l)) where u is the requester and l is the
location from where the request originated. The basic idea standing behind the
solution we are proposing can be applied, with some technical diﬀerences, to manage
with generic contextual data and authentication statements.
3 Theoretical Background
This section reminds the basics of belief theory and the Subjective Logic. All the
deﬁnitions reported here are taken from [11,13].
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Frame of Discernment] A ﬁnite set Θ is called a frame of discern-
ment, or simply a frame, when its elements are interpreted as possible answers to
a certain question and when we know or belief that exactly one of these answers is
correct. A state is an non-empty subset of elements in Θ.
A frame is an epistemic object; its elements are correct relative to our knowledge.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Belief Mass Assignment] Given a frame of discernment Θ, a belief
mass assignment is a function mΘ : 2
Θ → [0, 1] such that for each subset x ∈ 2Θ,
mΘ(x) ≤ 1, mΘ(∅) = 0, and
∑
x∈2Θ mΘ(x) = 1. Here, 2
Θ is the power-set of Θ.
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Given a state A, mΘ(A) expresses the belief assigned to A. It does not express
any belief in sub-states of A in particular. Given a belief mass assignment we can
calculate an opinion on a state to be true.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Opinion] Given a frame of discernment Θ and a belief mass as-
signment mΘ, an opinion on a state A ∈ 2
Θ is a triple (b(A), d(A), u(A)) in [0, 1]3
such that b(A) + d(A) + u(A) = 1. An opinion expresses the belief, the disbelief,
and the uncertainty about A to be true. It is calculated as follows (x ranges over
2Θ):
b(A) =
∑
x⊆A
mΘ(x) d(A) =
∑
x∩A=∅
mΘ(x) u(A) =
∑
x∩A =∅,x ⊆A
mΘ(x)
From (b(A), d(A), u(A)) it is possible to calculate the probability of expectation of
A being true, E(A) =
∑
x⊆2Θ mΘ(x)a(A/x). Here a(A/x), called relative atomicity
of A to x, stands for |A ∩ x|/|x|, where |A| is the cardinality of A.
We propose to use E( ) to be the context-aware function i.e., the trust( ) we
introduced in Section 2. Before showing how to deﬁne a frame of discernment in
our framework and how to assign a belief mass assignment on it, let us remind how
opinions can be combined. The Subjective Logic theory provides many operators
for combining opinions, but it requires opinions being built from a binary frame,
i.e., a frame that contains only two atomic states, A and its complement ¬A. Given
a (non-binary) frame, a binary frame can be build by “focusing” on a speciﬁc state.
Deﬁnition 3.4 [Frame with focus on A] Let Θ be a frame of discernment, mΘ a
belief mass assignment, and (b(A), d(A), u(A)) the belief, disbelief and uncertainty
on a state A ∈ 2Θ. Then Θ˜ = {A,¬A} is the binary frame with focus on A whose
mΘ˜ is deﬁned as follows:mΘ˜(A) = b(A), mΘ˜(¬A) = d(A), and mΘ˜(Θ˜) = u(A).
It can be proved that belief, disbelief, and uncertainty functions are identical
in 2Θ and 2Θ˜. aΘ˜(A) can be calculated consequently. In our framework we use
the commutative and associative operator ⊕, called Bayesian consensus, used to
“merge” opinions with the same focus. If ωsA = (b
s(A), ds(A), us(A)) and ωs
′
A =
(bs
′
(A), ds
′
(A), us
′
(A)) are two opinions on A in the subjective viewpoint of entities
s and s′, resp., and with relative atomicity as(A) and as
′
(A), resp., then the ωsA⊕ω
s′
A
is the opinion ω
[s,s′]
A of the imaginary entity [s, s
′]. The opinion ω
[s,s′]
A reﬂects the
opinions of s and s′ both in a fair and equal way. It is calculated in the following
way:
b[s,s
′](A) = (bs(A)us
′
(A) + bs
′
(A)us(A))/κ)
d[s,s
′](A) = (ds(A)us
′
(A) + ds
′
(A)us(A))/κ)
u[s,s
′](A) = (us(A)us
′
(A))/κ
a[s,s
′](A) =
(as
′
(A)us(A) + as(A)us
′
(A)− (as(A) + as
′
(A))us(A)us
′
(A))
us(A) + us′(A)− 2us(A)us′(A)
Here κ = us(A) + us
′
(A) − us(A)us
′
(A), and a[s,s
′](A) = (as(A) + as
′
(A))/2 when
us(A) = us
′
(A) = 1. More operators of the Subjective Logic are described in [11].
G. Lenzini et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 105–119110
p(l ∩l1 )
p(l1)
C
p(l)
l
l1
l2
l3
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) The frame we propose in our setting. (b) The situation referred by Example 4.1. The black spot
indicates where the user’s device is. l is the location where the user forwards his request. l1, l2, l3 are the
locations controlled by sensors s1, s2 and s3 respectively.
4 How to Calculate the Location-based Trust
This section discusses how to calculate trust(p(l)) i.e., the location-based trust in the
user staying in location l, the place from where the user forwards its authentication
request.
We indicate with L the space of all locations. The portions of L where user
devices can be detected are called cells. Because each device is also an identiﬁcation
item for the user, with a little abuse of terminology, we talk about user’s device
position and user position interchangeably. We let l, l1, l2 . . . range over the set
of all possible cells. We assume a set {s1, . . . , sn} of independent location sensor
sources; each si is responsible for the coverage of the correspondent cell li. Cells
l1, . . . , lk are not necessarily disjoint. The exact location of a user device within a
cell is unknown; it can occupy any position inside the cell with the same probability.
Sensors are also subjected both to false positive and false negative errors, so when
they trigger (resp., they do not trigger) the presence (resp., absence) of the user in
their cell is known only with a certain probability.When the sensor si detects the
presence of the user’s device (written si = 1) we know that the user u stays within
cell li (i.e., u ∈ li) with probability P (u ∈ li |si = 1). Because each si is expected to
scan its cell at known intervals of time, it is also known if a sensor has not triggered
(written si = 0). If it is the case, we know that the user stays outside the cell li
(i.e., u 	∈ li) with a probability P (u 	∈ li |si = 0).
We associate a frame Θi = {p(li∩l), p(li\l), p(l\li), p(L\(li∪l))} to each sensors
si. The frame Θi contains the (mutually disjoint) propositions about the location
of the user with respect to the zones that are intercepted, in L, by cell li and l (cf.
Figure 1 (a)). We associate the belief masses to Θi depending whether the sensor
has triggered or has not. In the following deﬁnitions we give the speciﬁcation of the
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belief mass mΘi in the two cases, written m
si=1
Θi
(x) and msi=0Θi (x), respectively:
msi=1Θi (x)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P (u ∈ li |si = 1),
if x = {p(li\l), p(li ∩ l)}
1− P (u ∈ li |si = 1),
if x = {p(l\li), p(L\(li∪l))}
0, otherwise
msi=0Θi (x)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− P (u 	∈ li |si = 0),
if x = {p(li\l), p(li ∩ l)}
P (u 	∈ li |si = 0),
if x = {p(l\li), p(L\(li∪l))}
0, otherwise
We now calculate the trust that a sensor si has in the proposition p(l) by applying
Deﬁnition 3.3. Once assigned the belief, disbelief and uncertainty we build a binary
frame Θ˜i = {p(l),¬p(l)} with focus on p(l), whose belief mass is set according to
Deﬁnition 3.4, that is mΘ˜i(p(l)) = b(p(l)), mΘ˜i(¬p(l)) = d(p(l)), and mΘ˜i(Θ˜i) =
u(p(l)). Then, we calculate ωsiu∈l for each sensor si. The overall trust is the Bayesian
consensus among the sensors opinions, that is ωu∈l = ⊕i(ω
si
u∈l).
Example 4.1 Let assume {l, l1, l2, l3}, and three sensor sources s1, s2, and s3
controlling the respective cells. The geometrical characteristic of the cells are
as in Figure 1 (b). Associated with our area of reference, L (a square includ-
ing all the cell, omitted in Figure) we have the following three diﬀerent frames
of discernment: Θi = {p(l \ li), p(li \ l), p(l ∩ li), p(L \ (l ∪ li))} for i = 1, 2, 3.
We assume to have P (u ∈ l1 | s1 = 1) = 0.99, P (u ∈ l2 | s2 = 1) = 0.97, and
P (u 	∈ l3 | s3 = 0) = 0.96. These probabilities are used to deﬁne the belief mass
assignment, as explained in the text. If a device is located in l2 as indicated by
the black spot in Figure 1(b) the sensors’ opinions about the device being in l
are, resp., ωs1u∈l = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) with a
s1(u ∈ l) = 0.75, ωs2u∈l = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) with
as2(u ∈ l) = 0.98, and ωs3u∈l = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) with a
s3(u ∈ l) = 0.75. The consensus
opinion is ωs1:s2:s3u∈l = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) with a = 0.78 and the probability of expectation
of belief, i.e., our trust(p(l)), is 0.78.
5 Instance of our framework
This section explains how our framework can be realised in a realistic sensors net-
work.
In section 4 we have assumed being able to calculate P (u ∈ li | si = 1) and
P (u 	∈ li | si = 0) for all i. Indeed, most product speciﬁcations of location sensors
give the conditional probability that the device is correctly detected when and
where it is present in its cell, that is P (si = 1 |u ∈ li) = qi. The probability of the
complement event i.e., P (si = 0 |u ∈ li) = 1− qi is called false negative probability.
In addition, location technologies provide the probability of a misidentiﬁcation,
that is the false positive probability P (si = 1 |u 	∈ li) = pi. Thus P (si = 0 |u 	∈ li) =
1− pi. We work under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Sensors are conditionally independent, that is, ∀j, i P (si = 1 |
u ∈ li) = P (si = 1 |u ∈ li, sj = 1) and P (si = 1 |u 	∈ li) = P (si = 1 |u 	∈ li, sj = 1).
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Fig. 2. (a) The intelligent coﬀee corner scenario. Diﬀerent sensors accept diﬀerent identity tokens to
authenticate user. (b) A screen-shot from the screen of the coﬀee corner scenario. Depending on the
authentication level of the user, the position of of a list of colleagues of his is displayed on the screen. The
authentication level is driven by the number of identity tokens that are shown at the coﬀee corner
Assumption 1 says that the position of a user device inside or outside a sensor’s cell
determines the behaviour of the sensor. Concerning this behaviour, each sensor is
independent on whether or not the other sensors of diﬀerent types are triggered.
Lemma 5.1 Under Assumption 1 we have P (u ∈ li |si = 1) =
qiP (u∈li)
P (u∈li)(qi−pi)+pi
and
P (u 	∈ li |si = 0) =
(1−pi)P (u ∈li)
P (u∈li)(pi−qi)+(1−pi)
Proof. It follows form the Bayesian theorem. 
Under the maximum entropy approach [3], the distribution of users in the grid
is uniform and P (u ∈ li) =
|li|
|L| and P (u 	∈ li) = 1 −
|li|
|L| . Thus, the expressions
in Lemma 5.1 become P (u ∈ li | si = 1) =
qi|li|
|li|(qi−pi)+pi|L|
and P (u 	∈ li | si = 0) =
(1−pi)(|L|−|li|)
|li|(pi−qi)+(1−pi)|L|
.
6 Validation and experimental results
This section describes and comments the simulation that validates our theoretical
framework.
The simulation refers to an intelligent coﬀee corner that has been arranged in
our research institute (Figure 2 (a)). A user approaching the coﬀee corner identiﬁes
himself by showing diﬀerent identity tokens, in fact, mobile items that are RFID,
Bluetooth, GPS, WiFi enabled. On a wall screen he can see the position of his
colleagues (see Figure 2 (b)), but this information is available only if the colleagues
have expressed, in terms of a policy, their approval be watched by that user. They
also request that their position is visible only if the identiﬁcation level of that user
is above a certain value. We assume that the user identiﬁes himself at the coﬀee
corner and that he obtains an authentication level L. This is what our coﬀee corner
is actually doing at the present implementation. The simulation shows how trust
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Fig. 3. The architecture of our trust-enhanced authentication solution. The security agent, i.e., the access
control engine, is supported by a recommendations manager that collects sensors data and recommendations
on security agent request.
changes when a user’s device moves away from the coﬀee corner. A number of
sensors for that device are disposed in the environment as in Figure 4. They scan
their cells at diﬀerent time rate so in the simulation we extend our theoretical
framework to cope with sensors whose outputs change with time.
We calculate trust(p(l)) depending on the position of the user’s mobile device.
Here l is the coﬀee corner location. Thus, the overall context-aware authentication
level, L trust(p(l)), is studied indirectly by following the trend of trust(p(l)).
Figure 3 depicts the three essential elements of our model of trust-enhanced au-
thentication architecture, which consists of the following subjects: a security agent,
a recommendations manager, and the set of sensors {s1, . . . , sn}. The security
agent evaluates the authentication level considering the credentials (cf. Section 2)
shown at the request. The recommendations manager collects opinions from the
sensors and calculates trust(p(l)). For keeping the explanation easier, we assume a
centralised implementation of the recommendations manager (a distributed imple-
mentation is also possible). For the same reason, all the sensors detect the same
type of mobile token, let say Bluetooth enable-devices. Our simulation uses a dis-
crete and linear time structure. The recommendations manager knows the sensors’
technical features, namely their false positive and false negative parameters, and
the geometry of the cells they control. It also knows the sensors’ scanning time
rate, ki. Thus, a sensor scans li every n · ki intervals of time, with n ranging over
naturals. For example, a sensor with scanning rate k = 5 scans its cell at time
0, 5, 10 and so forth. With si(nki) = 1 (resp., si(nki) = 0) we indicate that si has
detected (resp. has not detected) the user’s device in li at time interval t = nki.
By collecting the sensors’ outputs along time, the recommendations manager has a
complete knowledge of what happens in L.
Let assume, for a moment, that all the sensors have a unit scanning rate (i.e.,
∀i, ki = 1). At a certain time t, when the security agent demands for the evaluation
of trust(p(l)), the recommendations manager checks the data it has received from
the sensors, calculates their opinions ωsiu∈l(t) knowing what si has detected at time
t, and composes the overall trust as described in Section 4 and Section 5.
What does it happen when we release the assumption that all the sensors have
the same unit scanning rate? It may happen that si(t) = ⊥ where ⊥ means that
the sensor input is undeﬁned. It has not performed any scan at time t and no data,
for that time, are available to the manager. For what has been said so far, the
recommendations manager is able to calculate ωsiu∈l(t) for a sensor si only if it has
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Fig. 4. How the user device moves in our simulation. First, the device is close to location l, then it moves
away as intuitively depicted by the bold line. The unit of movement is 0.5. The exact device’s movement
is given by the following vector of positions: [0; 0; 0; 0.5; 0.5; 0.5; 1; 1; 0.5; 0.5; 0.5; 1; 1; 1.5; 1.5; 2; 2;
2.5; 2.5; 2; 2; 1.5; 1.5; 1; 1; 1; 1.5; 1.5; 2; 2; 2.5; 2.5; 3; 3; 3.5; 3.5; 4; 4; 4.5; 4.5; 5; 5; 5.5; 5.5; 6]. For all
i, qi = P (u ∈ li | si = 1) = 0.99 and p = P (u ∈ li | si = 0) = 0.01. The scanning rates of the sensors are:
k2 = k4 = 2, k1 = 1, and k3 = 5 unit of time.
a fresh datum from it.
In the simulation we estimate ωsiu∈l(t) from si(t
′), where t′ is the max{nki : nki <
t, si(nki) 	= ⊥} i.e., the latest interval of time where a datum is received from the
sensor. Thus, ωsiu∈l(t) is the opinion that emerges by considering an augmented cell
li(t) = li + δi(t − nki), where δi(t − nki) is the additional space that the device
detectable by si (and linked to the user) might have run in the while. Generally
speaking, the calculation of δi(t− nki) depends upon the following factors: (1) the
value of si(t
′) (i.e., the information the sensor has detected the last time) and (2)
the structure of L (i.e., its walls, the disposition of corridors, entrances, exits etc.,
and how users move into it).
The dependence from (1) has a conceptual motivation. If si(nki) = 1 this
means that at time nki there was evidence that the user was in li. If the user
has moved, he will be probably in li + δi(t − nki). To approximate ω
si
u∈l(t) we
reshape the frame by considering the new cell li + δi(t − nki). Anyhow, when
assigning the belief mass to this new frame of discernment, we use P (u ∈ li |si = 1)
(vs. P (u ∈ li + δi(t− nki) | si = 1)). Accordingly to the Subjective Logic theory,
because there are no new evidences (but only deductions) there is no justiﬁcation for
incrementing the belief. We use the previous amount of belief but “spread” over a
larger area. If si(nki) = 0, instead, this means that the sensor had evidence at time
nki that the user was not in li (if the user is somewhere in L, then the sensor had
evidence that u ∈ L\ li). In this case there is no justiﬁcation in using an augmented
cell, and δi(t − nki) = 0. Indeed, we could consider a negative δi(t − nki), which
means to assume that the user has moved within li, but it is unsecure to deduce
in favour of the user being close to the authentication location if no clear evidence
supports it. Then δi(t− nki) = 0 is a conservative and secure attitude.
The dependence from (2) requires a knowledge of L and a model of movement
of users in it. δi(x) is then deﬁned accordingly to that speciﬁc movement model. In
our simulation, we adopted a very simple solution: the user moves everywhere with
equal probability. Thus, when δi(t − nki) 	= 0 because of (1), li + δi(t − nki) is a
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Fig. 5. Graphic showing the change in trust(p(l)) in our simulation. The movement of the device is described
in Figure 4.
cell c′i with a larger radius than li. In our simulation we set a radius’s increment of
10% of t− nki.
Figure 5 reports the values we obtained for trust(p(l)) when the device moves
from l as explain in Figure 4. Looking at Figure 5, it is evident how trust stays
high when the device in within l; the three opinions converge on the belief that
user is in l. Trust starts decreasing as the device moves away from l. Interesting
are the little peaks in position, 2, 4 and 5. They are due to fresh data while the
conservative estimation of trust from the manager was decreasing trust. Finally,
trust drops down when the device comes into the range of sensor s4, and evidences
against the user being in l are communicated to the manager.
7 Related Work
The problem of distributed authentication has been widely studied for long time
(cf. [2]). To survey the eﬀorts and the contributions in this area would be too
ambitious. Our work addresses the authentication procedures and methods only in
suggesting the use of context and context-based trust as a subsidiary information
to improve the result from traditional authentication process.
From this point of view, Bhatti et al. [18] have already underlined the im-
portance of contextual information in access control and designed an access con-
trol scheme –an extension of their XML Role Based Access Control (X-RBAC)
framework– to incorporate trust domains and (temporal and non-temporal) contex-
tual condition into access control policies. Montanari et al. [16] recognised context
as an important factor in guiding both policy speciﬁcation and enforcement in the
speciﬁcation of dynamic and adaptable security policies in ubiquitous environments
(see also [23]). Our work does not focus on policy speciﬁcation and enforcement
based on context information, but instead it underlines the importance of contex-
tual information as a mean for trustworthiness evaluation. Moreover, we address
the theories of belief as a mean to cope with contextual information.
Bohn and Vogt discuss a probabilistic sensor fusion algorithm to predict an user’s
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position within a building [6]. The fusion algorithm runs over a map of the build-
ing, which constitutes the grid over which probabilities are combined and updated
along time. This work describes a complementary approach to ours. We think that
an approach based on belief theory is more appropriate than one based probability
theory for developing a general-purpose sensor fusion algorithm. In fact, our pro-
posal is easily scalable with the number of sensors and, although our approach is
instantiated with location based information, it can easily be be extended towards
other context types.
The use of belief theories in sensor fusing has been studied by Wu et al., who
used Dempster-Shafer Belief theory to fuse data coming from independent sensors
monitoring a user’s focus of attention during a round-table meeting [25, 24]. Sub-
jective Logic has been used by Svesson and Jøsang in intrusion detection to fuse
alerts coming from multiple detectors [21]. Alerts on diﬀerent anomalies are “con-
juncted” to calculate the belief if an attack, which is based on those anomalies, is
occurred. Alerts coming from not completely trusted sensors are discounted before
being processed. Subjective Logic has been also proposed and applied in a variety of
application domains concerning trust (cf. [10,12]). The beneﬁts of using Subjective
Logic with respect the Dempster’s Rule in sensor fusion are studied in [14]. Our
work conﬁrms the ﬂexibility and applicability of Subjective Logic where the need of
algebraically combining trust values is critical. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst
in applying Subjective Logic in the domain of context-aware trust combined with
traditional authentication methods.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
The amount of trust in an authentication procedure guarding the access to services
oﬀered in a pervasive and controlled environment like a building, depends not only
on the strength of the procedure but also on the context in which the authenti-
cation takes place. For example, when the authentication accepts as identiﬁcation
tokens “what the user has”, identity tokens lost, stolen, or forgotten can be used
by someone else to impersonate maliciously the user’s identity. We proposed and
described an evaluation method for enhancing the authentication procedure by the
use of contextual information, like location. Whilst the authentication procedure
determines the level of authentication considering the quality and number of the
identiﬁcation items shown by a user at the moment of the request, the trustwor-
thiness of the authentication combines the location of the multiple user-associated
identity tokens that are detected by means of a sensor network.
We use Subjective Logic to assign a trust value to the statement “the user,
whose identity emerges from the identity tokens provided, is standing at the location
where the request has been forwarded”. The trust value is then combined with the
(context-independent) authentication status of that user into a new (context-aware)
authentication status. The use of trust also allows less intrusive and more private
solutions for authentication: user’s conﬁdential credentials, like a PIN, can be asked
only in case of low trustworthiness on his position. Moreover, the context-dependent
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authentication status of the user can be used for optimising the security adaptation
of the access control process.
Because our simulations conﬁrm the theoretical expectation on the trend of trust,
we are currently implementing our algorithm in a oﬃce application that allows the
user to view, on a wall screen, the location of his buddy colleagues depending on
his authentication level. The authentication procedure we have now is based on the
recognition of personal devices assumed to belong to the user (i.e., PDA, badge,
laptop, Bluetooth devices, RFID). Here, we want to avoid unauthorised use of the
service, for example by someone else using a badge of that user, or sitting at his
desk, while the user is temporarily away.
Furthermore, there is a desire to extend our study towards solutions for the
establishment of contextual-trust maintenance. For this purpose we are going to
clarify how contextual information can concur to the management of the context-
aware trustworthiness of a certain trustee, and how contextual information aﬀects
the traditional trust establishment and management process.
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